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eminiscence of B[asliington 



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Early's ;5ttack in K64, 



f\ea6 before tl^e Ol^io Gon^n^ai^JieKVi of tt^e 
lsov|al liegioi^ of tl^e Qi^iteJ States, 



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# DECEMBER 5, 1883. ^ 



CINCINNATI: 

Peter G. Thomson, Printer, 

1884. 



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'' Guard well our country's C'ajDital, 
O, freemen, staunch and true." 



IN EXCHANGE 

JAN 5 . 1915 



A- ■» 



F^m i Qi5eeneeotWa^l7i Q^hon 



* • ■ AND ■ ■ * 



^8Myyf\[[ac\{- in- 1864. 



It was in May, 1864, that I first saw Washington. 
The warm sun of the spring-time was giving new life 
and color to the verdure of the parks which adorned 
the city. All the works of nature looked bright and 
pleasant, but the "grim visage of war'" was visible in 
the movement of armed men, the streets patrolled by 
soldiers, and the anxious looks of those in authority. 
The city was under military rule. 

It took me but a da}^ to learn that the wearing of 
my uniform required that I should be provided with a 
pass from proper military authority ; that, otherwise, I 
would be invited by the officer commanding the patrols 
to explain the apparent phenomenon of my appearance 
in the city to the Provost Marshal /;/ person. 

This impressed me at the time as ver}^ peculiar, 
for I couldn't understand why an officer (I wore the 
uniform of a lieutenant) should be suspected of being 



improperly absent from his command, especially at that 
time when every available man was needed at the 
front. I soon learned that there were those whose 
conduct had rendered this strictness necessary. 

I can recall to-day the gloom— the depression of 
spirits preceding an impending crisis— that pervaded the 
entire North just before Grant started through the 
Wilderness— an awful quiet which preceded the storm 
of batde. The people realized that an important crisis 
had come, and a death struggle was at hand. This 
had just begun as I reached Washington anxious to 
join my battery and take a part in the campaign then 
opening. 

I found my battery at Camp Barr3r_the artillery 
camp of instruction— with its re-enlisted veterans re- 
turned from furlough, its ranks strengthened with 're- 
cruits, and awaiting expected orders to go to the front. 
Owing to formalities required it was some days before 
I was regularly mustered into the United States service. 
I improved my spare time in visiting the public build- 
ings and grounds, and making a trip to Alexandria, 
where I visited the Marshall House, in which Elsworth 
had been killed; saw the stockades built to protect the 
city from surprise by a sudden assault of the enemy's 
cavalry, and examined some of the earthworks sur- 
rounding it. 

I saw there the first slave-pen I had ever seen 

the old slave-mart where, previous to the war, Virginia 
slave-stock had been bought and sold — now converted 
into a prison. It seemed, even then, a relic of a past 
and barbarous age. There it stood, visible evidence of 
a wrong that had a legal existence, which, in the light 
ot to-day, seems an inifossibility. 



* . • 5 •• «■ 

But the saddest of all my experience in Washing- 
ton was the result I witnessed of the dreadful carnage 
of the battlefield, when boat load after boat load of 
wounded soldiers from Grant's fighting-ground arrived 
from Belle Plains. The horrible wounds I then saw, 
and the suffering, left a strong and vivid impression 
upon my memory. I realized then what zvar was, and 
what soldiers, as brave men, are expected to endure. 
The sense of pain and sympathy with the wounded 
was strong and intense at first as we saw individual 
cases, but became deadened after beholding the multi- 
tude of wounded men and the magnitude of their suf- 
fering. Men with frightful injuries were trying with 
patience and quiet endurance to suppress an}' mani- 
festation of their evident pain. 

I particularly' recall three cases among the man}' 
which came under my obsei^vation. One, a young 
man, hardly older than myself at that time, lay upon 
a cot awaiting his turn to be moved, smoking a cigar, 
with a smile upon his face, as if it were a pleasant 
thing to lose a leg as he had lost his. Another poor 
fellow whose groans attracted my attention, had been 
shot through the groin and bowels and lay half ex- 
posed, unable to endure, quietly, his suffering. He 
seemed neglected because it was a hopeless case and 
others, who might be saved, demanded prompt attention. 
The third man walked from the boat supported by two 
men, one of whom, a medical officer I think, called 
my attention to him as they passed and said " this 
man has seven bullet wounds upon him, some very 
severe." All around lay the wounded, the dying, and 
the dead, for many a soul had quit its earthly tene- 
ment, on the wearisome trip to Washmgton, without a 



* . • 6 • . * 

kindly hand to soothe the dying brow, a friend to 
utter a prayer, or speak a final word. 

The cabins and the decks were piled with wounded, 
not a bit of space that could be occupied was vacant. 
And so the boats came, loaded^ at intervals during this 
period. As the wounded were carried from the boat 
and laid in rows upon the wharf, ladies — all too few 
for the work needed — came with flowers and soothing 
touches of the hand and encouraging words to alleviate, 
if possible, the pain of suffering humanity. Thoasands 
of wounded were brought in this way to the hospitals 
with which Washington at that time abounded. The 
dead body of my favorite cousin and former bed-fellow 
and elder companion, Charles P. Dudley, Major of the 
Fifth Vermont, passed through the city during this time 
— hit six distinct times, in as many different places, 
its future Colonel told me, whilst in command and 
leading his regiment in a charge. I am sure my ardor 
for battle might well have been somewhat subdued by 
such sights and these experiences. 

Having, however, obtained an order to be mustered 
in, I proceeded to the mustering officer and became a 
full-fledged second lieutenant. Proceeding to join my 
battery I was informed that it had been dismounted 
by sudden order at midnight, its guns and horses 
turned in, and that it had left on foot for Fort Marcy, 
Va. This was somewhat disheartening to a young 
man who had joined a light battery with high antici- 
pations of an active life on horseback, with an oppor- 
tunity to see the country, and, perhaps, the rebels. 
Nor was it any the less disgusting to the veterans of 
the battery, who thus, through no fault of their own, 
lost not only their favorite guns but the horses to 



which they were attached, and found themselves re- 
duced to the same footing as infantr}^ or heavy artil- 
lery upon whom they had looked down, hitherto, with 
some sense of superiority, as they rode along upon 
horse or caisson with various products of the country — 
pigs, turkeys, geese, and chickens — strapped to their 
saddles or hidden in the limber chests, sure of a good 
square meal when camp was reached, regardless of the 
commissary. It was very comfortable to belong to a 
light battery in those davs when rations were some- 
times short, tents a forbidden luxury, and traveling on 
foot very wet and mudd}^ 

My battery, " K," First New York Light Artillery, 
was not noted for being behind in providing for its 
own comfort. Few men could forage better. If I had 
permitted it, I might have been fully mounted and 
equipped, provided with horse, saddle, and bridle com- 
plete, "foraged" from the country outside our picket 
lines. Whilst Earl}^ was gathering up good stock in 
Maryland from Union citizens, one of our men — a good- 
natured, cross-eyed, jolly rascal, whom I was reprov- 
ing for having "run it" outside our pickets — offered 
to bring in a fine rebel horse and equipments if I 
would give him permission to go out. As I did not 
grant the permission, it is unnecessary to say that I 
did not get the horse. This same fellow I believe to 
have been a leader in a system of foraging upon our 
own rations, ten days extra supply of which were kept 
on hand and were receipted for by a lieutenant of 
infantry, and a guard placed over them. Notwithstand- 
ing all precautions the sugar and candles of the ration 
would unaccountably disappear from under the very 
eves of the sentinel until the brio-ht idea occurred to 



the post commander to transfer the responsibiHty of 
the rations from his officer to me. This was done with 
the understanding that men of my battery should be 
detailed as guard over it. That evening, when the 
battery was paraded at retreat, 1 informed the men 
that / had been made responsible for those rations, and 
desired that there be no more foraging in that direc- 
tion. A gentle smile passed through the lines, but no 
more rations were missed whilst I remained in charge 
of them. I ascertained, on enquiring, that the probable 
modus operandi in procuring the articles was to select 
their sentinel and whilst one or two engaged his at- 
tention others were sly]}'- helping themselves to the 
stores under his charge, which they hid under their 
blouses, carried outside, and traded with the countr}'- 
people for milk, eggs, and fruit. This cross-eyed in- 
dividual no doubt persuaded many a sentinel that his 
eyes were lixed upon ///;;/ whilst in reality they were 
fastened upon the sugar barrel or a box of candles. 

The dismounting of this batter}^ was but one item 
in the programme just then adopted by General Grant, 
which was to lill up his depleted ranks in the field 
by bringing there the regiments of heavy artillery which 
had been garrisoning the forts around Washington and 
^o replace them with a small number of such veterans 
as were most available to make a nucleus around 
which to gather a temporary strength from militia or 
volunteers who could be enlisted for a short period of 
time. Thus came the hundred-day regiments, mostly 
(if not all) from Ohio, some of which were in the 
course of subsequent events actively engaged and se- 
verely cut up. 

The heavy artillery guarding Washington had never 



before been called upon for other duU', and as, in the 
enHstments to fill the quotas of the different States, it 
was allowed men to choose their regiments, manj^ who 
enlisted or were drafted during the latter part of the 
war, preferred being behind breastworks, and in the 
vicinity of Washington, to taking their chances in the 
field ; in consequence of which and from comparatively 
small losses by sickness, etc., these regiments were 
immenseh' strong in numbers and larger than many 
brigades and not unequal to some divisions toward the 
close of the hard fighting of Grant's campaign. Some 
of them had to double up, being large enough for two 
regiments, the additional one being called a "provi- 
sional" regiment with the same name and number as 
the original. 

I well remember seeing one of them march up 
Pennsylvania Avenue, starting for the front, a mag- 
nificent bod}' of men, the companies full, well drilled, 
and thoroughl}^ equipped. Of the good service they 
rendered their decimated ranks gave evidence, as the 
small remnant of that same regiment again marched 
over Pennsylvania Avenue at the Grand Review which 
closed their military service preparatory to returning to 
their homes. 

To say that the}^ were satisfied, at the time, to be 
taken tVom what they considered to be their legitimate 
duty, marched to the front and used as infantry, would 
be wrong. Neither they nor the light artillervmen, who 
were dismounted to take their places, were satisfied, 
and the amount of hard swearing done on the part 
of each could not have been exceeded by that of the 
celebrated " army in Flanders." The climax of swear- 
ing on our part — I wont admit that I swore myself, 



* • • lO • • * 

as an individual — but the climax of collective swearing 
by the battery — was reached when the men were or- 
dered to lay aside their sabres and take up the mus- 
ket; the tinal completion, as they felt, of their degra- 
dation. Consider that the}^ had enlisted as light artil- 
lerymen ; many of them were veterans who had re- 
enlisted as such, they knew all about a battery, noth- 
ing whatever of infantry service or the use of a mus- 
ket ; could they well be blamed for their displeasure? 

I joined my batter}^ at Fort Marcy. This was a 
small earthwork located just beyond the Chain bridge, 
about half or three-quarters of a mile from it on the 
Leesburg pike. On its right was the Potomac river. On 
the highest elevation at its left was Fort Ethan Allen, 
the two works being connected by infantry trenches 
which would admit of the passage of troops partially 
under cover, or of being manned as breastworks. A 
like line, protected by an abatis, ran from Fort Marcy 
to the banks of the river. Across the pike a strong 
stockade with a loop-holed gate had been built, being 
intended as a protection against a sudden attack of 
cavalry. These two works, Ethan Allen and Marc}^, 
formed a Icte-dc-foiit in front of Ciiain bridge. On the 
other side of the river was Fort Sumner, with works 
extending to its right connecting the line with Forts 
Reno, DeRussy, and Stevens, which lay directly north 
of the western half of the city. 

The armament of Fort Marcy was not extensive. 
It consisted, as I remember it, of six or eight 30- 
pounder Parrott guns, two 20-pounders, and two 10- 
pounders pointing up the pike ; with two obsolete smooth- 
bores (32-pounders) mounted in barbette, upon wooden 
carriages, and tour field pieces, pointing to our left 



* ■ • 1 1 . • * 

front and toward the valley between the two forts. 
The rear of the work was only protected by an earthen 
gorge, through which was the entrance, closed by a 
strong gate similar to the one across the pike. The 
garrison consisted of about forty dismounted light ar- 
tillerymen of my battery and four companies of the 
One Hundred and Forty-seventh Ohio Volunteer Infantry 
(hundred days' men), commanded by Lieutenant-Colo- 
nel John R. Woodward. Fort Ethan Allen, the larger 
work and brigade headquarters, was garrisoned by the 
other part of m}^ battery, the One Hundred and Sixty- 
ninth Ohio (hundred days' men), and the remainder 
of the One Hundred and Forty-seventh Ohio, under 
command of Colonel B. F. Rosson. 

The line of works constituting the defences of Wash- 
ington at this time consisted of sixty-eight enclosed 
torts and batteries, encircling that city and Alexandria, 
mounting eight hundred and seven guns and ninet}'- 
eight mortars. Besides these there were a number of 
unarmed batteries. The entire circuit, leaving out the 
works at Chain bridge and omitting the distance across 
the Potomac at Alexandria, was thirty-three miles.* 

The defences, as finished, were calculated to atibrd 
fighting room for thirty-five thousand men, but at the 
time I am speaking of — May, 1864 — so many troops were 
withdrawn and called to the field that the dismounted 
batteries and "veteran reserves," or "invalid corps," 
constituted about all of the old soldiers on duty there, 
whilst the addition of the hundred days' men and other 
troops brought up the total strength to about thirteen 
thousand men, less than four thousand of whom were 



■Draper's "The Civil War in America," vol. iii, p. 424. 



12 



on the north side of the Hnes. General Earl}^, taking 
BarnarcVs Report on ■■' The Defences of Washington," 
inchides, in addition to the above, an estimate of three 
thousand nine hundred men for the First and Second 
District of Columbia Volunteers, Veteran Reserves, de- 
tachments, etc., five batteries of light artillery (six hundred 
and twenty-seven men), at Camp Barry, eight hundred 
cavalry at Fall's Church and Annandale, twelve hun- 
dred dismounted cavalry at Camp Stoneman, and thus 
swells the total to over twenty thousand men ; but this 
report also shows that there were only three thousand 
seven bundled and sixteen men in the defences north 
of the Potomac, July loth.* 

Such was the condition of affairs at Washington in 
the Spring and earl}^ Summer of 1864. 

Meanwhile, Grant was dealing blow after blow to 
the Army of Northern Virginia, and pushing it, by des- 
perate battles, step by step, gradually, but surely, into 
the defensive works at Richmond and Petersburg until 
Lee was so badly punished that it was necessary for 
him to get his army behind the works and act solely 
on the defensive. Earh^ in June the siege began, after 
an inefTectual attempt by Grant to carry the works of 
Petersburg by assault. 



'■■In the defences north of the Potomac, July loth, 1864: Infantry, i,8iq; 
artillery, 1,834; cavalry, 63 ; total, 3,716. South of the Potomac : Infantry, 
4,064; artillery, 1,772; cavalry, 51 ; total, 5,887. North, 3,716; South, 5,887; 
Troops in, or near, city (estimated), 3,500. Draper's total, 13,103. 

General Early's estimate (from Barnard) of effectives in Washington, 
July 10th, 1864: First and Second District of Columbia Volunteers, Veteran 
Reserves, and detachments, 3,900; Veteran Reserves (six regiments), 4,400; 
light artillerymen, 627; cavnlry at Fall's Church and Annandale, 800 ; dis- 
mounted cavalry at Camp Stoneman, 1,200; total, 10,927. Add, in lines north 
and south, 9,603. General Early's total, 20,530. See National Republican, 
August 4th, 1S81. 



* • 13 ■ * 

Grant's plans included a movement up the Shenan- 
doah Valley to Lynchburg, and General Sigel, on the 
I St of May, had started in that direction with ten 
thousand men, but was met and beaten at Newmarket, 
on the 15th, by the Confederate general, Breckinridge. 
Sigel was thereupon relieved and General Hunter 
placed in command. 

Breckinridge being called to Richmond to assist in 
its defence, Hunter assumed the offensive and won a 
fight at Piedmont on the 5th of June, capturing fif- 
teen hundred prisoners, some guns, and a quantity of 
small arms. With a force of twenty thousand men he 
then moved toward Lynchburg, where Breckinridge lay 
with a small force of Confederates. 

Lee, realizing the danger of the loss of Lynchburg,* 
re-enforced it with a corps from Richmond. Hunter, 
finding himself confronted by a strong force, and being 
short of ammunition and supplies, was compelled to re- 
treat, June i8th, and fell back across the mountains 
toward the Kanawha river, leaving the Shenandoah 
Valley open, and Washington exposed. 

Upon previous occasions a demonstration which threat- 
ened danger to Washington resulted in immediate move- 
ment of the Armv of the Potomac for its protection, 
and Lee seizing the opportunity offered, and no doubt, 
believing it might cause the recall of Grant and his 
army to protect the National Capital, ordered Early, 
who had headed the corps from Richmond for the re- 
lief of Lynchburg, to march down the valley for that 
purpose. General Early, collecting a force estimated to 



* See "Memoir Last Year of the War," etc., by General Early, p. ^8. 
Note, 



* . . 14- • ^ 

be about twenty thousand men,* but which, he states, 
according to official reports, consisted of but about ten 
thousand infantry' and not over three thousand cavah^}' 
and artillery,! marched northward, and his troops ap- 
peared upon the Potomac July 2d and 3d. General 
Sigel, who was at Martinsburg, retreated to Harper's 
Ferry, losing his stores. 

On the 6th of July the enemy reached Hagerstown, 
and a strong column moved toward Frederick, where 
General Wallace, commanding the Union troops in Mary- 
land, was concentrating them. His strength was about 
eight thousand to ten thousand men,]; mostly home 
guards and hundred days' volunteers. He met the rebels 
at Monocacy, July 9th, and was defeated with consid- 
erable loss. The check, however, to Early's advance 
was of great service in giving time for the arrival of 
the Sixth Corps and part of the Nineteenth, which 
reached the city of Washington not an hour too soon 
for its safety. 

The anticipation that the siege of Petersburg would 
be raised as a result of Earl^^'s movement, was not 
realized. General Grant was determined not to have 
the strong grip he held upon the throat of the Con- 
federacy, broken or withdrawn. There is no doubt 
but that he was entreated, implored, and perhaps 
almost commanded, by frightened officials to come to 
Washington, for the derhoralization there at this time 



•■■Draper's "Civil War in America," vol. iii, p. 406, and General Wal- 
lace's estimate, Abbott's "Civil War in America," vol. ii, p. 562. 

t General Early's " Memoir Last Year of the War," etc , p. 49, and Let- 
ter in National Republican^ Washington, D. C, Aug. 4th, 18S1. 

I General Early's estimate, "Memoir Last Year of the War," etc., p. 55. 
Abbott's "History of the Civil War in America," vol. ii, p. 562. Greeley, in 
his "American Conflict," puts Wallace's force at only three thousand men. 



was extensive. But for once all efforts were in vain. 
He did, however, detach the Sixth Corps from the 
Army of the Potomac, and also ordered the Nineteenth 
Corps, just arrived at Hampton Roads from the Gulf 
Department, to proceed to Washington. 

During the advance of the enemy there was the 
greatest excitement and alarm, particular!}^ after Wal- 
lace's defeat. So far as we could judge up to that 
time no one seemed to know whether the movement 
was only a raid by Mosby, or an attack by the 
whole rebel army. Rumor had it both wa3^s. 

Our first knowledge of Early's expedition came 
from hearing artillery firing in our front in the direc- 
tion of Edward's Ferry, on the afternoon of July 5th, 
so plain and distinct that some of the hundred days' 
men bathing in the river came rushing back thinking 
it might be an attack upon the fort. At intervals, in 
the stillness of that night, 1 heard the rumbling of 
batteries moving along the road on the opposite side of 
the river. The firing in our front continued during the 
night and the next morning, and at eleven o'clock we 
were posted at the guns, and visited by General Augur, 
who was in command of the defences of Washington. 

At two o'clock on the morning of the 8th, we 
were turned out to our guns by the Post Commander, 
who announced that a force of cavahy and artillery 
was approaching at Drainsville, in our immediate front. 
Some of the infantry were brought inside the fort to 
assist in manning the guns — our men being sufficient 
only to work the 30-pounder Parrotts covering the 
pike. Four companies of infantry were sent from 
Fort Ethan Allen to re-enforce us. On Sundav, the 
loth, we learned of the' defeat of General Wallace, 



* • • i6 . . * 

and could plainly hear cannonading on the Maryland side, 
evidentl}^ drawing nearer and nearer to Washington. 

The alarm in that city was intense. The enemy's 
cavalry-advance had reached Rockville, about ten or 
twelvg miles from Washino-ton, and the folio winir 
forenoon was in front of our lines followed bv the 
infantry which. General Early says, had bivouacked the 
night before four miles from Rockville, and had 
moved out at daylight on the nth, the advance reach- 
ing our lines a little after noon,* The veterans of the 
Arm}^ of the Potomac and Nineteenth Corps had not 
yet landed, f The northern lines of the defences of the 
city were inadequately manned by a small force of 
veterans supported only by hundred days' men and 
militia, ]; and lay an easy prey to an energetic enemy. 
The danger of capture was great. Our men took 
muskets at midnight and slept beside the guns, all the 
hundred days' men being at that hour ordered to Fort 
Reno, where the}' report they Ibund upon their arrival 
at daybreak the enemy in front of the work and 

■•'■'General Early says, ''twelve or fifteen miles from Washington," "Memoir 
of Last Year of the War," etc., p. 56, and National Republican, Aug. 
4th, 1S81. Draper, "Civil War in America," p. 407, says, "Early was 
within six miles of Washington on the evening of the loth." The distance 
from the Capitol to Rockville is about sixteen miles, and tlie distance of 
Fort Stevens from the Capitol was at least five miles, leaving the distance 
from F'ort Stevens to Rockville, eleven miles. Add four miles, to where 
the infantry bivouacked, and they had fifteen miles to march. Whilst 
Early was marching this distance troops had to be sent to re-enforce the 
northern lines, principally from forts south of the Potomac. All re-en- 
forcements had to march five miles, at least, and those south of the Poto- 
mac more, according to their locality. It took sonic time to organize the 
Quartermaster's men, etc. 

t General Early quotes General Barnard's report to show that General 
Wright and the Sixth Corps arrived at two P. M. on the nth, and 
reported for duty at four p. m.; nine hundred men being put on the 
skirmish line. {National Republican, Aug. 4th, i88r.) 

J Total 3,716 men. See note, p. 12. 



* . . 17 • • * 

heavy skirmishing going on.* I observed that forenoon 
that there was fighting to the north of Fort Sumner, 
and, with a glass, saw pickets out, the smoke from 
the guns, and cavahy in motion. 

A brigade of the enemy's cavahy had cut the rail- 
road and telegraph lines between Baltimore and Havre- 
de-Grace, and between Washington and Baltimore, f 
and communication with the North ceased. They ap- 
proached Baltimore, and that city was in a ferment. The 
situation was critical. The clerks of the departments 
were organized into companies and armed, able-bodied 
patriotic citizens took arms ; ever}^ convalescent soldier 
able to carry a musket shouldered one, and a hetero- 
geneous crowd, composed of black and white, artil- 
lerymen, cavahy, and infantry was marched out from 
the camp of distribution. But on the 12th, the 
Sixth and Nineteenth Corps having re-enforced the 
lines, I a heavy reconnoitering force was sent out in 
the afternoon in front of Fort Stevens. President 
Lincoln, in his anxiety, had met these corps as they 
landed on the wharf, his heart gladdened to see the 
veterans entering the city in time to save it.§ 



* "Ohio in the War." Vol. ii, p. 677. 

f General Early, in National Republican, Washington, Aug. 4th, 1S81. 
See " Memoir Last Year of the War," pp. 53-54. 

XQt.wt\2i\'^2ix\y,\r\. National Republican, Aug. 4th, 1881, quoting from 
General Grant's report of July 22d, 1865, says : " The Sixth and Nineteenth 
Corps reached Washington at two P. M., on the nth, and General Wright 
reported at three p. M., his troops coming up about four P. M." 

\ President Lincoln was also present at Fort Stevens, when the Sixth 
Corps attacked the Confederate skirmish line, and was exposed to the fire of 
their sharpshooters. It was with difficulty that General Wright could 
persuade him to leave his exposed position, and only after an officer standing 
near the President had been hit. Even then he would look over the parapets, 
exposing his person until the affair was over, when he cheered as heartily as 
the others present at the success of our attack. 



i8 



The rebel skirmishers were not long in finding that 
they had veterans in their front, and falling back, that 
night Early's retreat began. On the 13th, he was re- 
ported as re-crossing into Virginia, and we prepared for 
action, but they passed us b^^ only a few stragglers 
being gathered in by our pickets. The arrival of the 
Sixth and Nineteenth Corps gave assured safetv to 
Washington, and the citizens once more slept peace- 
fully, under their protection. 

Whatever may be the reason assigned tor the fail- 
ure to attack /;/ force, Early's golden opportunity was 
lost. That he might have entered the city by an 
attack made with energy and display of force at the 
time he first appeared in front of the defences, seemed 
apparent to those inside the lines. The commander 
of the forces is usually held responsible for any failure, 
from whatever cause, to do what is hoped or expected 
of him, and this case has been no exception to the 
rule. 

A signal officer who saw the attack that was made, 
told me it was expected first upon Fort DeRussy? 
and owing to the small available force at hand, nearly 
all our infantry had been concentrated there. The rebel 
sharpshooters, however, got into an orchard in front of 
Fort Stevens, and for twenty minutes, until the infantr}-^ 
could be sent under cover of the trenches to drive 
them oflT, they cleared the guns of cannoneers, so that 
it was impossible to man them. This statement being 
true, a very small force could, at this time, have entered 
and captured the work, which being done, the 
flanks of the adjoining works would be exposed and 
their capture certain. The line once broken, the work 
was done, and the city would be in their possession. 



* • • 19 • • * 

But tl.e attack made was not supported, and was appar- 
ently without expectation of success. 

General Early says,* that his infantry force had been 
reduced after the battle of Monocacy to eight thousand 
men, a large number of whom were completely exhausted 
by the last two days' marching, and he was satisfied that 
not more than one-third of his force could be brought 
Hito action. He also states, that his advance-a small 
body of cavalry-arrived for the first time in front of 
the defences about noon of the nth, and that he fol- 
, lowed, arriving in person a little after noon ; that he 
discovered that the works were but "feebly manned," 
but before his leading division could be brought up 
and his force be concentrated and get into the works, 
"a column of the enemy" from towards Washington, 
"filed into them on the right and left, skirmishers were 
thrown out, and an artillery fire was opened from a 
number of batteries."! 

This statement subtantially admits the possibiHty of 
success by a prompt and energetic assault then, had 
his troops been so situated as to attack at the time of 
his arrival, and is also evidence that the forces amount- 
ing to fifteen thousand men according to his estimate, 
including the dismounted cavalry convalescents, quart- 
ermasters' men, etc.,: which he says were in the 
trenches and works on the side against which his advance 
was made, were not there, and had not manned those 
defences when he first saw them, for their presence in so 

can, 1:^::;:';^, '^" "^^^" ^^^ warTet^^^^sr^^T^^^r^T^— 
^..i^:::!":;?!? zt""- -' ^^-^ ^-- °^ '- ^^-'" p- 57, ana ^..... 



* • • 20 • * 

short a line would have been evident and have left no 
impression that "the lines were feebly manned." They 
arrived later. After their arrival, his own force being 
up, an examination was made by General Early to 
determine if it were practicable to carry the defences 
by assault, ^ut finding them "exceedingly strong," and 
his own troops exhausted from the march, he refrained 
from the assault. After dark he held a consultation 
with his Generals, and determined to make an assault 
on the works at daybreak next morning, unless some 
information should be received, showing its impractica- 
bilit}'. During the night a despatch from General 
Bradley Johnson, from near Baltimore, informed him 
"that two corps had arrived from General Grant's 
army and that his whole army was probably in motion."* 
This caused him to delay the attack until he coujd 
examine the works again, which he did at daylight and 
finding the parapets " Jined with troops," "reluctantly 
gave up all hopes of capturing Washington," after he 
had "arrived in sight of the dome of the capitol, and 
given the Federal authorities a terrible fright." f 

Greeley, in his " American Conflict," (Vol. II., p. 605), 
says, "If Early had rushed upon Washington from the 
Monocacy by forced marches, and at once assaulted with 
desperate energy, he might have taken the city, and might 
have lost half his arm3^ He must have lost all if he had 
carried the city and attempted to hold it." 

. Granting this, as we look back upon the past, the 
question will arise, whether or not the result of the 
destruction of the capital city, the probable capture of 



*»'Memoir of the last year of the War," by General Early, p. 59. 
\ See preceding note. 



* ■ • 21 • * 

the president of the country and its chief officials, and 
the raiding of its treasiny, would not have had an 
effect upon the action of foreign countries, even then 
sympathizing with the South, sufficient to have justified 
a general in risking an army where success might, 
perhaps, have saved his cause. 

I give General Early the credit of believing that 
he understood this, and would have taken the risk even 
of great loss, had there been, in his opinion, an}- pros- 
pect of success. He says that the undertaking to cap- 
ture Washington was his own conception and not Lee's 
orders, the latter only directing him to threaten the 
city.* He has been blamed for dela3'ing the attack, 
but it is easier for men to criticize, especially after the 
fact, than to act if themselves placed in like emergency. 
He had a large and tempting prize before him if suc- 
cessful, but a heav}- responsibility in case of failure, 
and ought not to be condemned upon ex-parte e\'idence. 
By his own statement there zvas a possibi/ity of suc- 
cess ; but his force was small and its condition such 
as to prevent his taking advantage of the chance, and 
this "fortune of war" gave time for the arrival of 
re-enforcements and saved the city. The whole case 
maybe summed up in these words: " //(? -was too late."' 

Early was pursued by two corps, the Sixth and 
Nineteenth, ituder command of General Wright, and 
retreated up the valley never again to disturb Wash- 
ington. The two pursuing corps, after his retreat, 
were ordered to join Grant and came back within our 
lines encamping just across Chain bridge, on the Mary- 
land side, where their camp tires at night, dotting the 

■^General Early in National Republica^t^ Aug. 4th, 1881. 



* • ■ 22 • • * 

hillsides, presented a beautiful and picturesque sight. 
In a few days, however, word came that Early was once 
more advancing toward the Potomac and crossing into 
Maryland. The veterans retraced their steps toward 
the Shenandoah, and General Grant determined to crush 
out the force which had been annoying him, placed 
Sheridan in command (August 7th), and he, from that 
time forward, drove Early back by a succession of 
brilliant fights, sent his forces " whirling through Win- 
chester," and closed up affairs in the Shenandoah Val- 
ley in a way well-known to history, and reflecting 
honor and renown upon himself and his command. 

Early was disposed of, and, with the exception of 
Mosby who disturbed our pickets and occasionally cap- 
tured some of our cavalry, we were troubled no more. 

On the 2 2d of August a German regiment of Penn- 
sylvania volunteers arrived from Charleston Harbor and 
relieved the hundred days' men at our post, who started 
homeward next day. As they marched past the White 
House they halted and were thanked for their services 
by the President.* Their losses had been gj-eater than 
would be supposed ; their duties had been arduous ; they 
had been fnuch exposed to the malarious influence of 
the climate, and there was much consequent sickness, 
so much that "quinine and whiskey" had been reg- 
ularly issued. Some of the regiments, especiall}' those 
with Wallace at Monocacy, were badl}- cut up in the 
held ; others had suffered but little. 

The services they had rendered were valuable to 
the country ; they had served their purpose ; Washing- 
ton was safe ; their work was done, and, as they gladly 
turn their faces homeward, my reminiscence closes. 

•■■See "Ohio in the War," vol. ii. p. 677. 



peRnulipe* 



